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Abstract The continuing debate between Persson and
Savulescu and myself over moral enhancement con-
cerns two dimensions of a very large question. The large
question is: what exactly makes something a moral
enhancement? This large question needs a book length
study and this I provide in my How to be Good, Oxford
2016. (JH 2016). In their latest paper Moral Bio-
enhancement, Freedom and Reason take my book as
their point of departure and the first dimension of the big
question they address is one that emphasizes a distinc-
tion, not highlighted in their original 2008 paper,
between a moral enhancement that will ensure an im-
provement in morality and one that will simply make
people more motivated to be moral. The second issue
concerns whether anything that would be a Bmoral
enhancement^ properly so called, could involve deny-
ing moral agents the very possibility of autonomously
choosing to try to be good. In this response, although
P&S cover a number of other related issues, I shall
concentrate on these two points.
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What is Moral Enhancement?
The continuing debate between Persson and
Savulescu (P&S) and myself over moral enhancement
concerns two dimensions of a very large question. The
large question is: what exactly makes something a moral
enhancement? This large question needs a book length
study and this I provide in my How to be Good, Oxford
2016. [1]. In their latest paper Moral Bioenhancement,
Freedom and Reason P&S take my book as their point
of departure and the first dimension of the big question
they address is one that emphasizes a distinction, not
highlighted in their original 2008 paper, between a
moral enhancement that will ensure an improvement
in morality and one that will simply make people more
motivated to be moral. The second issue concerns
whether anything that would be a Bmoral enhancement^
properly so called, could involve denying moral agents
the very possibility of autonomous moral choice.
In this response,1 although P&S cover a number of
other related issues, I shall concentrate on these two points.
P&S initially predicated their whole, veritable Norse
Saga, of moral enhancement on the absolute necessity to
save the world from even a lone maniac or idiot who
might by accident or design wreak literally limitless
harm. Because of the scale of the harm that might be
done by such an outlier they originally argued that coun-
termeasures in the form of moral enhancement would
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have to be foolproof, universal and obligatory. They have
since back-peddled considerably (although they seem
unaware of this) and now talk of moral enhancement as
matter, not of ensuring and controlling outcomes, but of
improving moral Bmotivation^, which word, or its var-
iants, appears six times in their latest paper.
They now say two mutually contradictory things. The
first is that we must motivate people to choose the moral
path, not that we must absolutely prevent them from
choosing the immoral one. But they also continue to
defend the desirability of a BGod Machine^ or its equiv-
alent whichwhile (they now claim) does not itself amount
to a moral enhancement properly so-called, none-the-less
constitutes an enhancement that, if it could be invented,
would make the world a better place precisely because of
its ability to control what it would deem to be seriously
immoral behaviour. This still seems to me both false in
fact, because it would not make the world a better place,
and a literally monstrous perversion of anyminimal sense
of what might constitute a moral enhancement.
They make a point of saying that I now seem to agree
with them but, I am afraid, it is they that, to large extent,
have come to agree with me, at least on one of these two
points.
Lets see what’s going on.
They say (2008: 174):
Even if only a tiny fraction of humanity is immoral
enough to want to cause large scale harm by
weapons of mass destruction in their possession,
there are bound to be some such people in a huge
human population… unless humanity is extensive-
ly morally enhanced.
A moral enhancement of the magnitude required
to ensure that this will not happen is not sufficient-
ly possible at present and is not likely to be pos-
sible in the near future…
until effective means of moral enhancement are
found and applied…
Genetic engineering of smallpox could create a
new strain which would wipe out all or most of
humanity.
And P&S ([2]: 174) conclude that:
If safe moral enhancements are ever developed,
there are strong reasons to believe that their use
should be obligatory…That is, safe, effective mor-
al enhancement would be compulsory.
Hence the attraction of the God Machine. It is
important to be clear that P&S apparently believe,
or once believed (maybe no longer?) that it was
simply not enough to develop forms of moral en-
hancement that involved the creation or modification
of people so that they were more Bmotivated^ to do
good. Public and personal safety demands, according
to the previous P&S, that as far as is humanely
possible the sort of moral enhancement that could
achieve this had to be, in their own words (2008,
174), Bof a magnitude to ensure that this will not
happen^ and accordingly that the implementation of
moral enhancement that could achieve this Bshould be
obligatory… That is, safe, effective moral enhance-
ment would be compulsory .^
In clarification of how this could, in theory, be both
universal and compulsory they offered, the implausible,
but on their view optimal, solution if only it could be
realized: a BGod Machine^ [3] which would have a
purpose built Bfreaky mechanism^ to prevent wrongdo-
ing. They now admit that the God machine would not be
a moral enhancement though it would, they believe, be a
very good thing.
They say: (2016: 2).
BImagine, however, that there is a freaky
mechanism in your brain which would have
kicked in if you had been in the process of
making, … a decision to do something which
is morally wrong. The mechanism would then
irresistibly have made you decide to do the
morally right thing. Hence, you are not free
to fall, i.e. you cannot avoid deciding to do
the morally right thing.^ This freaky mecha-
nism lead to the building of a God Machine
to prevent serious wrongdoing.^
I had objected in my book [1] and elsewhere,
that morality was basically a matter of choosing
what is for the best all things considered, not
simply being well motivated or pro-social; in short
that to be good is not simply happening to do no
evil but choosing for a reason, choosing on the
basis of evidence and argument, not to do wrong.
S&P (2016: 2–3) now admit:
BThe freaky mechanism does not count as moral
enhancement in our vocabulary, since it does not
enhance yourmotivation to dowhat is morally right.
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Rather, it deprives you of your freedom – and even
ability – to decide to do and do what is wrong.^
But notice that this is just what S&P originally
claimed that moral enhancement should aim at, namely
to Bensure^ (i.e. guarantee) that wicked cataclysmic
events would not be chosen and to make assurance
doubly sure, that such measures had to be in the words
of S&P Bobligatory^ and Bcompulsory .^
S&P now, more that a little disingenuously say:
To sum up, it seems to us that if Harris were to
cash out the metaphors quoted above, he would land
in our position that moral enhancement in the sense
of enhancement of moral motivation is necessary to
make us act morally more often. Enhancement of
moral motivation is not inimical to reasoned judge-
ments about morally relevant matters, like suffering,
but rather presupposes them. (2016: 2).
S&P go on to remind readers that their God Machine
(GM) is just the freaky mechanism universalized and
that: ‘GM only restricts freedom or ability to act to a
small extent^ (2016: 4–5) and they conclude by re-
asserting their literal Bespousal^ of GM as a good idea
if it could only be created: BWe espouse the way of MB
because, though long and difficult, it may be necessary to
this end^ the end being Bto anticipate criminal actions,
e.g. terror attacks, and nip them in the bud, and GM is a
particularly effective way of doing that.^ (2016:6) GM
may only Brestrict freedom or ability to act to a small
extent^ but as I have arguedwhere and to the extent that it
does it cannot count as a moral enhancement.
Could we Rely on a God: Machine or Person?
S&P rightly point out that the Gods with whom (which?)
we are familiar are far from perfect, and this, while
broadly right, is clearly an understatement. But all the
Gods (except those created by S&P?) are either fictional
or mythical, or if they are not their differences cancel
each other out. It is important to be wary of how far their,
admittedly freaky, God should be believed in or trusted if
it were ever to be created by the would-be God-makers
P&S. I have argued [1] that it is not clear that even a God
Machine with powers of thought similar to those of any
known Gods could make the relevant distinctions re-
quired by the P&S formula.
I have also argued [1] that anyGMworthy of the name
would have to be capable of thinking for itself and could
not be relied on simply to follow a programme devised by
P&S. Suppose, for example, the God machine talked
itself into the idea that humanity is led into moral temp-
tation by that which delights the eye and by the pleasures
of the flesh, and so engineers all future children to be
blind and incapable of sexual pleasure. The malign, ma-
licious mechanism that the GM is might just be capable
of talking itself into such an intervention, much in the
same way as some other moral monsters have for centu-
ries made related interventions, often in the name of a
God like the GM invented by man, to for example,
deprive women of analogous possibilities by genital
cutting.
If the senses of sight and sexuality were to be removed
at a stage of development prior to the development of
sight or sexual desire, future generations would not know
what they were missing, and so by the sort of reasoning
used by P&S, would neither be rendered un-free by the
inability to experience these sensations any more than
would those ‘doctored’ by the God Machine into a pro-
sociality they had not chosen to exhibit.
To take a more realistic case: suppose your passport
has been, unbeknown to you, cancelled so you are not
free to travel – you would be turned back at border
control or when attempting to board a plane. Even when
you are not thinking of using it, you are proud of your
passport and the freedom and re-assurance it gives you,
but this has been rendered illusory. It would be odd to
think that no harm had been done so long as you never
travelled or became aware of the freedom limiting deci-
sion that had been taken against you.
It is essential to the line run by S&P that all these
Frankfurt-style cases show that the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities is false, but this is, at the very least,
highly controversial [4]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [5] for example, glossing John Locke’s fa-
mous discussion of Blocked room^ cases (the model for
Frankfurt style cases) where someone stays voluntarily
in a locked room and never discovers that he had in fact
no Balternative possibility^ to leave, notes:
BVoluntariness, then, is not necessary for freedom;
but it is also not sufficient for freedom, as Locke’s
Blocked room^…The man in the locked room wills
to stay and talk to the other person in the room, and
this volition is causally responsible for his staying
in the room: on Locke’s theory, his remaining in the
room is, therefore, voluntary. But the man in the
locked room Bis not at liberty not to stay, he has not
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freedom to be gone^ (E1-5 II.xxi.10: 238).^ (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-freedom/. )
Many seriously ill people hoard pain killers so that
they have a lethal dose to hand in case of need. [6, 7]
Suppose, unbeknownst to them, the God machine has
substituted sugar pills to deprive them of their ability,
their freedom, to decide the time andmanner of their own
death. Just the sort of thing P&S’s moralistic machine
would do! And yet P&S seem to believe that no harm
would have been done and no threats to freedom would
have been made so long, that is, as they die without ever
choosing to have recourse to their now useless safety net.
I hate to risk yet another accusation of chauvinism (see
below) by quoting that very English writer William
Shakespeare. Shakespeare has Cassius explain that his
ability to kill himself, when and if he so chooses, is a
guarantee of ultimate liberty:
But life, being weary of those worldly bars,
Never lacks power to dismiss itself.
If I know this, know all the world besides,
That part of tyranny that I do bear
I can shake off at pleasure.
William Shakespeare Julius Caesar Act I. Sc. III.
S&P seem to think that capacities like autonomy and
liberty, or more modest ones like the ability to speak
Italian, are capacities only possessed when actually
exercised and hence are only lost when we try and fail
to exercise them. Suppose the God machine capriciously
took against the Italian language andwiped outmy ability
to speak that beautiful tongue (albeit badly) while I slept.
Would I only have been wronged when I tried but failed
to speak Italian, and if I had died without ever having the
occasion to try, would I have suffered no deprivation, no
harm, no insult and no injury whatsoever?
I judge the answer to be clear, and I am afraid, one
which renders P&S’s account implausible.
Is Harris as morally Bankrupt as the God Machine?
I end by noting and responding to two complaints S&P
make of my own moral conduct or character, one of
which, my penchant for literary quotations, has already
been mentioned.
BHarris is fond of sprinkling his text with quota-
tions from literary authors, but they are all (with
the exception of some classical) British: Shake-
speare, Milton, Byron, Auden, and Golding. If his
choice of literature had been less chauvinistic, it
might have included Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov and Ivan Karamazov’s dia-
tribe against God.^ (2016: 4)
Concerning my fondness for acknowledging the
wisdom and power of literary and artistic sources as
well as more academic or ‘philosophical’ ones, I am
certainly guilty as charged. However the charge of
chauvinism is both tendentious and entirely unwarrant-
ed by the available evidence, evidence of which S&P
must have been aware.
I am unclear why classical sources are to be
discounted, (perhaps because none of them could be
British?) but even, for the sake of argument allowing
this, my book contains reference to or quotation from no
less than18 non-British, non-classical and non-
university literary and artistic sources, as a brief glance
at the Index would have revealed. It is gratifying I am
sure for both S&P as well as for myself, to be able to
record that S&Pmanaged to find just one literary source
to quote back at me.
Lastly, S&P also seem to be claiming some sort of
originality for the idea that women tend to have a rather
better record for goodness, or more accurately, that they
demonstrate a much more restricted predilection for evil
than do men, and that one strategy for moral improve-
ment might involve the feminization of the world. They
seem to think I should have acknowledged their priority
for noting this (2016: 2):
On the basis of this, we suggested that MB could
consist in makingmen in general more like women
in general in respect of the capacity for sympathy.
Without acknowledging any awareness of our pri-
or discussion, Harris proposes a ‘radical femini-
zation of men’ (2016: 85) as a way of achieving
moral enhancement. As we explicitly did.
I freely admit to a failure here, I was indeed aware of
the discussion to which they refer and it is true that I
chose not to further discuss or cite their previous, but not
prior, discussion. This is in part because I had myself
discussed at length analogous possibilities in my book
The Value of Life, published way back in 1985. I then
devoted half of Chapter 8 of that book to a discussion of
the feminization of the world. I there imagined that a
resurgent feminism believed:
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...a good measure of the evils of the world had
been brought about both by the dominance of
men, and by the dominance of certain distinctively
(though not exclusively) male characteristics.
Suppose they believed, as many women do, that
men were on the whole more egocentric, aggres-
sive, competitive and intolerant than women, and
that these features made them in turnmore violent,
insensitive and perhaps more callous. It might
then seem a rational and progressive step to attempt
to create a society from which these disastrous
characteristics, and the characters that possessed
them, had been eliminated.… ([8]: 166)
The rationale of this society might be the simple
proposition that reform required not the develop-
ment, acceptance and implementation of a new
political and moral theory, but rather required a
new type of citizen. And the society which produced
such citizens would be founded on and embody, not
a political so much as, say, a eugenic theory.
This might not be so bizarre or so crazy a view as
might at first appear. One of the fears most com-
monly expressed about attempts to change the
human personality by genetic engineering, so that
more desirable features would become dominant
is simply that we cannot predict what other unde-
sirable changes would be consequent on such an
attempt. This fear, particularly, characterised
much of the discussion about the desirability of
eliminating aggression from the human psyche. It
was pointed out that, while aggression was
undesirable, it might not be possible to eliminate
such an emotion without also destroying the
basis of other more desirable emotions, such as
love. What would love be like if it did not involve
some aggression towards anyone or anything
that would destroy our loved ones, for example?
Now in proposing an all-female society, we would
not be faced with quite the same problems. For
one thing we knowwhat women are like–we would
not be contemplating the creation of new or
radically altered human beings…([8]: 167-168)
As will be clear from the passages just quoted, my
discussion prefigured both the possibility of genetic or
other bioenhancement to effect moral improvement of the
sort which has now, decades later, been espoused and
allegedly invented by S&P. I then went on to outline
one possible and morally defensible scenario or thought
experiment for achieving a radical feminization of the
world’s future population. I note, but do not complain,
that S&P do not acknowledge any awareness of my prior
discussion, which anticipated their ‘invention’ of moral
bioenhancement by 30 or so years, in a book that is still
widely available today. (https://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=
nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=
John+Harris+%22The+Value+of+Life%22. ).
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